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Saving Stare Decisis: Preclusion, Precedent, and 
Procedural Due Process 
Max Minzner 
ABSTRACT 
 Judgments do not bind nonparties. This core due process constraint 
on issue preclusion means that courts can only adjudicate questions of 
fact and law with respect to those individuals appearing in court. 
However, the operation of stare decisis routinely extinguishes the rights 
of nonparties without notice or an opportunity to be heard. This Article 
examines the due process challenge to the operation of precedent. The 
traditional justifications for applying a due process analysis only to 
preclusion and not to precedent are inadequate. Instead of excepting 
stare decisis from the operation of procedural due process, we should see 
it as meeting those requirements. Using the Supreme Court’s analysis 
from Mathews v. Eldridge, stare decisis can survive a due process 
challenge based on the central value of third party reliance. While stare 
decisis survives in general, applying notions of procedural due process 
changes the traditional view of precedent in important situations. In 
cases where reliance is nonexistent, or where the initial process was 
corrupted, application of stare decisis may not withstand a due process 
challenge.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In June 2008, the Supreme Court handed down Taylor v. 
Sturgell,1 the most recent in a series of decisions over the last ten 
years reaffirming the due process limitations on nonparty preclusion. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit had applied a broad doctrine of preclusion to bar a Freedom 
of Information Act2 claim on the theory that the plaintiff had been 
 
  Associate Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. E-
mail: minzner@yu.edu. I would like to thank Margaret Lemos, Alex Reinert, and the 
participants in the University of New Mexico Faculty Workshop for their comments and 
suggestions. 
 1. 128 S. Ct. 2161 (2008). 
 2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552–552b (2006).  
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“virtually represented” by his friend in a prior lawsuit over an 
identical FOIA claim.3 The Supreme Court reversed, quoting its own 
sweeping language from Richards v. Jefferson County,4 which held 
that the “application of claim and issue preclusion to nonparties runs 
up against the deep-rooted tradition that everyone should have his 
own day in court.”5 Richards itself reversed the Alabama Supreme 
Court’s attempt to apply claim preclusion to plaintiffs who had not 
been party to a prior lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of a 
state tax regime. Even though the Alabama Supreme Court had 
already decided the constitutionality of the tax in question,6 it could 
not preclude the plaintiffs from relitigating the issue.7 Both Taylor 
and Richards recognize strong due process protections for 
nonparties, establishing a constitutional right to relitigate issues 
already decided in prior lawsuits. 
Simultaneously, though, both courts accepted, without analysis, 
a different nonparty preclusion doctrine. The Court agreed that the 
precedential effect of the prior lawsuit could bar the claim. The 
Richards Court states, but does not explain, that “a state court’s 
freedom to rely on prior precedent in rejecting a litigant’s claims 
does not give it the freedom to bind a litigant to a prior judgment to 
which he was not a party.”8 Taylor not only fails to draw a distinction 
between stare decisis and preclusion, it explicitly relies on the value 
of stare decisis in attempting to justify its preclusion conclusion: 
“Stare decisis will quickly allow courts to swiftly dispose of repetitive 
lawsuits.”9 The Supreme Court made no attempt to explain why the 
broad “day in court” due process protections limiting the effect of 
preclusion does not impose an identical limit on the effect of 
precedent.10 The arguments offered in the academic literature for this 
 
 3. Taylor v. Blakely, 490 F.3d 965 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 4. 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996). 
 5. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2171. 
 6. Jefferson County v. Richards, 662 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Ala. 1995). The prior 
challenge to the constitutionality of the tax scheme only raised state law questions while the 
challenge in Richards itself dealt with a federal constitutional claim. Richards, 517 U.S. at 796. 
 7. Richards, 517 U.S. at 804–05. 
 8. Id. at 805. 
 9. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2178. 
 10. This due process based challenge differs from the argument that stare decisis is 
unconstitutional because it requires the Supreme Court sometimes to favor precedent over 
original meaning or the claim that stare decisis is subject to abrogation by Congressional 
statute. See, e.g., John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 
503 (2000); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare 
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distinction between the due process restrictions on preclusion, but 
not precedent, have been similarly unpersuasive.11 
This Article attempts to fill this gap and save stare decisis by 
grounding it in the Supreme Court’s procedural due process 
jurisprudence. While not used explicitly in the preclusion literature, 
the three-prong test from Mathews v. Eldridge12 provides a 
mechanism to understand why we treat issue preclusion and stare 
decisis differently from a due process standpoint. In particular, the 
effect on absent nonparties does not simply endanger stare decisis 
from a due process standpoint; it saves it as well. Because we expect 
third parties to rely on prior decisions of courts, we have to bind 
them as well.  
 The rest of the Article is organized as follows. Part II.A 
outlines the Supreme Court case law on the due process constraints 
on preclusion and contrasts it to the very limited case law from any 
court raising due process concerns about stare decisis. Stretching 
from Hansberry v. Lee to the recent decision in Taylor, the Court has 
been clear that nonparties cannot suffer from the preclusive effects of 
judgments, but courts have given little attention to the question of 
whether the precedential effects of those decisions raise comparable 
concerns. Part II.B analyzes the traditional justifications for drawing 
a line between preclusion and precedent. Two primary arguments are 
used to support the distinction. First, stare decisis is more flexible 
than preclusion, leaving nonparties free to argue that the prior 
decision was misguided and should not be followed. Second, courts 
 
Decisis Require Adherence to the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L. 
REV. 1165 (2008); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of 
Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 289 (2005); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible 
Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706, 2731–34 (2003); Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and 
Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the 
Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals from the Twenty-Third 
Century, 59 ALB. L. REV. 671, 679–81 (1995). But cf. Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional 
Circularity, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2002) (responding to these critiques). 
 11. See infra Part I.B. One recent article suggests that some aspects of stare decisis are 
unconstitutional. Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1011, 1012 (2003) (“I argue that the preclusive effect of precedent raises due process 
concerns, and, on occasion, slides into unconstitutionality.”). While Professor Barrett and I 
reach some different conclusions, her excellent analysis helped shape this Essay, especially Part 
I. 
 12. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Mathews factors are (1) the private interest affected by 
the official action, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of additional procedures, 
and (3) the burden on the government from providing additional process. Id. at 335.  
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may view issue preclusion as applying solely to questions of fact while 
stare decisis covers questions of law. Neither of these arguments 
carries the day. 
Part III argues that while the line of cases from Hansberry to 
Taylor would not support the current doctrine of stare decisis, we 
can save the doctrine by considering it through the lens of the 
Supreme Court’s three-part test in Mathews v. Eldridge. Mathews 
provides a cost-benefit analysis for determining the necessary 
procedure to be provided. Through this lens, the value of stare 
decisis can allow it to survive in situations where preclusion falls. 
Because we expect third parties to rely on decisions that receive 
precedential effect, but not on those that merely receive preclusive 
effects, this reliance interest tips the scale of the Mathews balancing 
test. 
Part IV explores the implications of applying Mathews to 
preclusion and stare decisis. I argue that while Mathews saves stare 
decisis generally, current aspects of the Supreme Court’s approach to 
stare decisis still remain at risk. In particular, the Supreme Court has 
treated reliance as merely a policy consideration in most cases 
involving challenges to precedent. However, the key role reliance 
plays in saving stare decisis means that, in cases where reliance does 
not exist, due process may impose limits on courts’ ability to rely on 
precedent. Second, applying due process constraints means that in 
cases where the original process was fundamentally flawed, stare 
decisis cannot survive.  
II. THE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE TO STARE DECISIS 
A. Due Process and Preclusion 
The term preclusion covers two distinct and related doctrines. 
Claim preclusion, classically known as res judicata, bars the 
relitigation of a claim that was, or should have been, raised in the 
first lawsuit as long as the first lawsuit ended in a valid final judgment 
on the merits.13 Claim preclusion requires that both the plaintiff and 
 
 13. If the judgment in the first lawsuit was in favor of the plaintiff, the claim is 
extinguished, merges with the judgment, and then the plaintiff, if necessary, can sue on the 
judgment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17–18. If the judgment was in 
favor of the defendant, the judgment extinguished the claim and bars any future claim. Id. § 
19. As a result, claim preclusion was classically referred to as the doctrine of merger and bar. 
See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984). 
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the defendant be identical in both suits.14 Claim preclusion defenses 
frequently arise when a party has unsuccessfully litigated a claim in 
the first lawsuit and later attempts to bring a different, related claim 
in a subsequent lawsuit.15 Issue preclusion, in contrast, does not bar 
the entire claim but simply precludes relitigating a discrete issue.16 As 
long as the issue was actually litigated and decided in the first suit, 
resolution of the issue was essential to the result, and there was a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate, parties are barred from challenging 
the resolution in the first litigation.17 Notably, unlike claim 
preclusion, issue preclusion does not require the parties to be 
identical. With the rise of nonmutual issue preclusion, parties can 
benefit from an initial lawsuit in which they did not participate.18 
While courts have generally abandoned the requirement that the 
party benefitting from preclusion must have participated in the initial 
lawsuit, there is no such flexibility with respect to the party burdened 
by preclusion. The due process limits on nonparty preclusion are 
staples of the traditional civil procedure course—a party is only 
bound by a prior decision if they, or their privity, participated in the 
original lawsuit.19 The Supreme Court recognized, though, that 
 
 14. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154 (1979) (“Preclusion of . . . 
nonparties falls under the rubric of collateral estoppel rather than res judicata because the latter 
doctrine presupposes identity between causes of action.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS § 17 (“A valid and final judgment is conclusive between the parties . . . .”).  
 15. See Alvear-Velez v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing the 
rule against claim-splitting); Barrett ex rel. Estate of Barrett v. United States, 462 F.3d 28, 38 
(1st Cir. 2006) (same). 
 16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (“When an issue of fact or law is 
actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is 
essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the 
parties, whether on the same or a different claim.”). 
 17. Id.; New Hampshire v. Maine, 542 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2001). 
 18. Justice Traynor’s opinion for the California Supreme Court in Bernhard v. Bank of 
America, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942) was the key event in the decline of the mutuality 
requirement for issue preclusion. At the federal level, the Supreme Court abandoned the 
mutuality requirement in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 
402 U.S. 313, 322 (1971) (permitting nonmutual defensive issue preclusion) and Parklane 
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (permitting nonmutual offensive issue 
preclusion). While nonmutuality is now the majority rule, mutuality continues to exist. 
Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So. 2d 917, 919 (Fla. 1995) (holding that Florida law continues 
to require mutuality); Quinn v. Monroe County, 330 F.3d 1320, 1330 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(relying on Stogniew as good law). 
 19. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that due process requires that the party 
suffering as a result of preclusion must have been a party in the initial lawsuit. The Supreme 
Court’s due process case law surrounding preclusion stretches back to Hansberry v. Lee. 311 
U.S. 32 (1940). Hansberry, a challenge to the issue preclusive effect of a fraudulent stipulation 
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preclusion was appropriate in certain situations, such as properly 
constituted class actions, where parties absent from the litigation 
were adequately represented by the parties who were present. Lower 
courts repeatedly attempted to expand the scope of this “adequate 
representation” exception,20 and the Supreme Court has frequently 
rebuffed these attempts.21 
Most recently, the Court handed down Taylor v. Sturgell, which 
involved a dispute between two airplane enthusiasts and the FAA. 
Greg Herrick, the owner of an antique F-45 airplane, sought 
information in a FOIA request from the FAA in order to help him 
restore his plane.22 The manufacturer of the airplane, the Fairchild 
Engine and Airplane Corporation, had submitted technical data to 
the FAA in 1935 as part of the process of getting the plane certified 
for manufacture and sale.23 The FAA retained all of this information 
but denied the FOIA request on the theory that the information fell 
within the FOIA trade secret exception.24 Herrick filed suit in district 
court, arguing that the manufacturer had surrendered its trade secret 
claim by submitting a 1955 letter to the FAA’s predecessor agency 
authorizing documents to be released to the public for use in making 
repairs or replacement parts. The district court rejected this 
 
in a prior lawsuit, set up a two-part holding. First, due process prohibits binding nonparties, 
and second, class actions are only effective when the representative parties adequately represent 
the class members. Id.  
 20. Most recently, several circuits have applied a “virtual representation” theory, 
permitting claim preclusion when the party in the second lawsuit was similarly situated to the 
party in the first lawsuit, an approach usually dated back to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in 
Aerojet v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1975). The Circuits varied in the requirements for 
virtual representation. See, e.g., Taylor v. Blakely, 490 F.3d 965, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2007); 
Gonzalez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 27 F.3d 751 (1st Cir. 1994). For a historical justification of 
the virtual representation theory, see Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal 
and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193 (1992). The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Taylor likely represents the end of the virtual representation line of cases.  
 21. For instance, in 1996, the Supreme Court overturned the Alabama Supreme Court’s 
decision in Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996) (discussed in the introduction), 
even though the lower court concluded that the plaintiffs in the first action adequately 
represented those in the second action. Just three years later, in South Central Bell Telephone 
Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999), the Court came to the same conclusion that the state 
could not rely on adequate representation even when the lawyers were identical and the 
plaintiffs in the second action were aware of the first lawsuit. 
 22. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2168. 
 23. See Herrick v. Garvey, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1322 (D. Colo. 2000).  
 24. Id. at 1323. FOIA exemption 4 permits the government to withhold “trade secrets 
and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or 
confidential.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). 
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argument on two theories. First, since the documents were never 
released to the public, they retain trade secret status; and second, 
even if the documents had lost trade secret status as a result of the 
1955 letter, they regained it when the manufacturer successfully 
reversed the waiver of trade secret status by objecting to the FAA 
after Herrick’s FOIA request.25 The Tenth Circuit affirmed.26 While 
it disagreed with the district court’s conclusion on the waiver of 
trade secret status, it accepted the FAA’s argument that the 
reclamation of trade secret status was successful.27 Notably, the 
Tenth Circuit merely assumed, and did not hold, that trade secret 
status could be reclaimed and further assumed that the timing of the 
reclamation of the statutes was irrelevant.28 The FAA and the 
manufacturer were allowed to argue that the status had been 
reclaimed even though the reclamation took place after Herrick filed 
the FOIA request. 
Enter Herrick’s friend Brent Taylor, another airplane enthusiast. 
After submitting his own FOIA request to which the FAA failed to 
respond, he filed suit in the Federal District Court in the District of 
Columbia making arguments identical to those raised by Herrick.29 
In addition, he raised the arguments waived by Herrick in the court 
of appeals, claiming both that the manufacturer could not revive 
trade secret status for the documents and that even if revival was 
possible, it could not happen after the FOIA request took place.30 
The district court dismissed on a virtual representation theory since 
Herrick and Taylor were close associates, were represented by the 
same lawyer, and had apparently shared litigation documents.31 The 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed, announcing its own 
version of the virtual representation test.32  
The Supreme Court reversed and clearly identified the limited 
situations in which nonparty preclusion is appropriate. The Taylor 
Court outlined six categories of nonparties who can suffer as a result 
 
 25. Herrick, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1327–29. 
 26. Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 27. Id. at 1194. 
 28. Id. at 1194 n.10. 
 29. Taylor v. Blakely, 490 F.3d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 30. Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2168 (2008). 
 31. Taylor, 490 F.3d at 969. 
 32. Id. at 972. 
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of litigation.33 First, nonparties who agreed to be bound are 
precluded even if they did not initially participate.34 Second, 
individuals who assumed control of the litigation, even if they did 
not act as a party, are bound.35 Third, nonparties to the first suit who 
act in a representative capacity for someone who was a party in the 
initial litigation can be precluded.36 Fourth, nonparty preclusion can 
operate pursuant to a special statutory scheme, such as bankruptcy or 
probate.37 Fifth, nonparties in particular legal relationships with 
parties can be precluded.38 Finally, in certain situations, nonparties 
 
 33. The Court drew on the Restatement in establishing these categories. Taylor, 128 S. 
Ct. at 2172 n.6. 
 34. Id. at 2172; see also Sampson v. Sony Corp. of Am., 434 F.2d 312, 315 (2d Cir. 
1970) (holding parties bound by stipulation that the decision in a separate lawsuit would 
resolve their claims); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 40.  
 35. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2173. The classic example of this type of nonparty preclusion 
arose in Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979), where the United States government 
directed and financed litigation by a government contractor in a Montana state court lawsuit 
challenging the constitutionality of a state gross receipt tax. Even though the federal 
government was not a party, the Supreme Court found that the state court decision that the 
tax did not violate the Supremacy Clause had preclusive effect in a later federal court lawsuit 
since the government “exercised control” over the state court litigation. Id. at 155.  
 36. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2173. The canonical preclusion-by-representation case is 
Chicago Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611 (1926). In Schendel, the 
administrator of the estate of a deceased employee brought an action against the railroad 
employer under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act. The railroad had previously brought a 
worker’s compensation proceeding against the employee’s widow, the sole beneficiary of the 
estate, in which the arbitrator determined that the employee was engaged in intrastate, rather 
than interstate commerce. Id. at 614–15. The Supreme Court found the determination with 
respect to interstate commerce to be preclusive in the second suit even though the parties were 
formally different since “[t]he essential consideration is that it is the right of the widow, and of 
no one else, which was presented and adjudicated in both courts.” Id. at 618. 
 37. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2173. Probate and bankruptcy both adjudicate the rights of 
absent parties. Claims against estates and bankrupts are lost if not properly presented. See Tulsa 
Prof’l Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) (probate); NLRB v. Bildisco & 
Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 529–30 n.10 (1984) (bankruptcy). The Supreme Court has not clearly 
explained why nonparty preclusion is constitutional in these cases, but the answer probably lies 
in the need for finality. In this way, these proceedings can be seen as another example of 
Mathews-style balancing where the value of finality is allowed to overcome the general rule 
against nonparty preclusion. See infra Part II for a broader discussion of Mathews.  
 38. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2172. Classically these relationships have been called “privity,” 
although the Taylor Court recognized that privity had lost its content and had simply come to 
stand for the proposition that nonparty preclusion was appropriate. Id. at 2172. See also, e.g., 
Nash Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 640 F.2d 484, 493 (4th Cir. 1981) (providing an example 
of a collecting case); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir. 1950) 
(Goodrich, J., concurring).  
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adequately represented by the participants in the initial lawsuit may 
be bound.39 
If we accept that the same due process standards outlined in 
Taylor and its predecessors apply to both issue preclusion and 
preclusion by precedent, how does stare decisis fare?40 Not 
particularly well. Consider again the facts of Taylor. If the Tenth 
Circuit had actually held that trade secret status could be 
“reclaimed” under FOIA, Taylor holds that it would be 
unconstitutional to find that Taylor was issue precluded41 from 
relitigating this question.42 However, Taylor would clearly be barred 
by stare decisis from relitigating this issue43 in the courts of the 
Tenth Circuit, at least until the level of en banc review.44 
 
 39. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2172. 
 40. One difficulty with applying the analysis in Taylor to different contexts is that the 
Court has never clearly explained why nonparty preclusion is so unacceptable aside from the 
“deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.” Id. at 2171 
(quoting Richards v. Jefferson, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)). Prior case law takes a similar 
approach, simply citing to the history without explaining it. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 
40 (1940) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878)). 
 41. One might try to distinguish this hypothetical on the grounds that Taylor and its 
most relevant predecessor cases involve claim preclusion, and therefore, perhaps the due 
process standards are reduced for issue preclusion. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, 
though, leaves no room for this argument. Taylor views issue preclusion and claim preclusion 
as identical. “A person who was not a party to a suit generally has not had a ‘full and fair 
opportunity to litigate’ the claims and issues settled in that suit. The application of claim and 
issue preclusion to nonparties thus runs up against the ‘deep rooted historic tradition that 
everyone should have his own day in court.’” Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2171 (quoting Richards, 
517 U.S. at 798). The Supreme Court’s previous case law on issue preclusion reaches exactly 
the same conclusion. “Some litigants—those who never appeared in a prior action—may not 
be collaterally estopped without litigating the issue. They have never had a chance to present 
their evidence and arguments on the claim. Due process prohibits estopping them despite one 
or more existing adjudications of the identical issue which stand squarely against their 
position.” Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971). 
 42. Nor do any of the Taylor exceptions apply differently when seen through the lens of 
issue preclusion or preclusion by precedent. The relationship between Taylor and Herrick 
remains the same. Taylor still would not have agreed to be bound by the first litigation, would 
not have taken control of the initial litigation, and would not be acting as Herrick’s 
representative. No special statutory scheme exists to permit nonparty preclusion. Since Taylor 
does not fall within any of the six categories for purposes of issue preclusion, it is hard to argue 
that he would qualify for one of them for purposes of preclusion by precedent. 
 43. Arguably, a party is not barred from relitigating an issue by stare decisis; they are 
simply prevented from winning on the point. This argument hardly distinguishes preclusion 
and precedent sufficiently for constitutional purposes. In fact, stare decisis is arguably more 
binding in some ways than issue preclusion. Preclusion is a defense and must be raised in a 
defendant’s answer or is waived. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8. The argument that the stare decisis 
effect of a prior decision bars a claim, though, can be raised on a motion to dismiss under  
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 Despite this straightforward argument, courts have seldom 
faced the question whether stare decisis is unconstitutional and have 
not taken the argument very seriously when presented with it.45 The 
following section deals with the traditional justifications for treating 
issue preclusion and stare decisis differently and argues that they are 
inadequate. 
B. The Traditional Distinctions Between Preclusion and Precedent 
Two major justifications have been put forth to explain the more 
lenient due process treatment of stare decisis when compared to issue 
preclusion. The first is the alleged flexibility of stare decisis.46 In the 
cases where it applies, issue preclusion acts as an absolute bar to 
relitigation of the identical issue. Parties cannot argue that the issue 
should be reexamined simply because the outcome is wrong.47 In 
contrast, stare decisis theoretically leaves courts open to revisit the 
legal issue. Courts can and do change their mind on legal questions, 
and under the Federal Rules, parties are free to make any 
nonfrivolous argument in favor of changing the law.48 Similarly, 
parties can also distinguish prior decisions, arguing that the legal 
issues are actually not the same between the two suits. 
 
Rule 12. A defendant need not file an answer, and if not raised then, it can be raised up to, 
during, or after trial. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(2). 
 44. The Tenth Circuit, like other circuits, follows the rule that one panel cannot 
overrule a prior panel. See Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P. ex rel. Jeff P., 540 F.3d 1143, 
1150 n.6 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 45. See Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1228 (6th Cir. 1987). On occasion district 
courts have been reversed for giving decisions from other district courts undue weight. See Nw. 
Forest Res. Counsel v. Dombeck, 107 F.3d 897, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Colby v. J.C. Penney 
Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987). See generally Barrett, supra note 11, at 1026–27 
(discussing Dombeck and Colby). Additionally, in Atlantis Development Corp. v. United States, 
the court found intervention as of right proper on the theory that the intervening party might 
be affected by the decision as a matter of stare decisis even though they would not be bound as 
a nonparty. 379 F.2d 818, 829 (5th Cir. 1967). For a more extensive discussion of 
intervention and stare decisis, see infra at Part II.B. 
 46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 cmt. i (1982) (noting that stare 
decisis is “less limiting” than preclusion because courts can revisit issues); 18 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4425 (3d ed. 1998) (noting that 
stare decisis is “flexible”). 
 47. See Federated Dep’t Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981); Consol. Edison 
Co. v. Bodman, 449 F.3d 1254, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Goss v. Goss, 722 F.2d 599, 605 
(10th Cir. 1983).  
 48. See FED R. CIV. P. 11. 
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The second primary defense of the different treatments of issue 
preclusion and stare decisis turns on the distinction between fact and 
law.49 Perhaps issue preclusion simply applies to questions of fact 
while stare decisis governs questions of law, and while due process 
prohibits binding nonparties to factual determinations made by the 
court, there is no due process violation in binding nonparties to the 
legal determinations of a prior court. 
Both of these justifications are deeply flawed.50 Stare decisis 
doctrine, as it is now applied in some courts, is far from flexible. 
While it is true that the United States Supreme Court retains the 
option of reopening any question of law presented to it, other courts 
do not have that flexibility. First, as a matter of vertical stare decisis, 
decisions of higher courts bind lower courts.51 The United States 
Supreme Court has frequently made clear that lower courts are not 
free to reexamine its decisions, even when intervening precedent 
severely calls them into question.52 Furthermore, horizontal stare 
decisis in the United States Courts of Appeal is similarly inflexible. In 
all circuits, decisions of prior panels bind current panels even if they 
are wrong.53 These legal questions are not open to reargument on 
the theory that they are incorrect. At the very least, these rules 
require nonparties to the first litigation to seek review at a higher 
level than would have been required had the first lawsuit never taken 
place. 
Perhaps even more troubling, the notion of flexibility assumes 
that review is available within the court system considering the 
second case. In situations where jurisdictions are not applying their 
own law, flexibility is effectively eliminated. Take for example, 
 
 49. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162 (1979); United States v. Moser, 
266 U.S. 236, 242 (1924); 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 46, § 4425 n.3. 
 50. Professor Barrett persuasively argues that these justifications fail. See Barrett, supra 
note 11, at 1043–49.  
 51. See Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain 
Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1161 (2005) (drawing 
the distinction between vertical and horizontal precedent). For the seminal article analyzing 
the binding effect of decisions on lower courts, see Even H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior 
Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1993). 
 52. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 207 (1997) (“The Court neither 
acknowledges nor holds that other courts should ever conclude that its more recent cases have, 
by implication, overruled an earlier precedent. Rather, lower courts should follow the case 
which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” 
(citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)). 
 53. See Barrett, supra note 11, at 1017 n.19. 
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Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications,54 in which an interviewee for a 
magazine article brought a breach of contract action against the 
magazine publisher and the journalist, claiming that the reporter did 
not honor her promise of anonymity.55 Sitting in diversity, the 
federal court was bound to apply Minnesota state substantive law.56 
The Minnesota Supreme Court had recently held that confidentiality 
agreements between sources and reporters did not constitute a 
legally enforceable contract under state law.57 The Court of Appeals 
(correctly) viewed this decision as absolutely binding under Erie.58 
The plaintiff’s rights were extinguished by the prior case in as 
inflexible a manner as would have occurred had she been a party.59 
At least theoretically, the plaintiff could have sought certification 
to the Minnesota courts to revisit the question. Minnesota, like many 
states, has adopted the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law 
Act,60 allowing federal courts to certify questions of state law to the 
state supreme court.61 Certification, though, is not available for all 
states;62 and, more to the point, is strongly disfavored under precisely 
these circumstances. Certification is a process designed to clarify the 
law and is specifically disallowed when a party wants to argue that a 
previous decision was incorrect and should be changed.63 A party in 
 
 54. 939 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 55. Id. at 579–80. 
 56. Id. at 582. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (providing 
the standard regarding whether state substantive law should apply). 
 57. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990), rev’d on other 
grounds, 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
 58. Ruzicka, 939 F.2d at 582. 
 59. While the plaintiff in Ruzicka selected the federal forum and could have filed in state 
court in an effort to preserve her opportunity to reargue the question before the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, the defendant could simply have removed the case to federal court under 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006). No defendant was a Minnesota citizen. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) 
(2006). 
 60. MINN. STAT. § 480.065 (2008). 
 61. See 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 46, § 4248 (discussing history of certification); 
Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions of State Law, 
88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1687–90 (2003). 
 62. 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 46, § 4248. 
 63. Id. (“If the state court has already said what the law is, a federal court, which 
disagrees with that statement of the law, should not certify a question in the hope of 
persuading the state court to change its mind.”); see also Tarr v. Manchester Ins. Co., 544 F.2d 
14, 15 (1st Cir. 1976) (“The purpose of certification is to ascertain what the state law is, not, 
when the state court has already said what it is, to afford a party an opportunity to persuade the 
court to say something else.”). 
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federal court sitting in diversity (or in a state court applying the law 
of a different state) is inflexibly bound by the out-of-jurisdiction 
precedent. 
The ability to distinguish precedent also fails to save stare 
decisis.64 Cases certainly can be distinguished factually, and recent 
empirical work examining the binding nature of precedent has 
reached mixed conclusions.65 It is clear, though, that for the parties 
within the scope of a decision, the decision still has bite. The plaintiff 
in Ruzicka had no plausible argument to distinguish the prior 
decision. She still bases a contract claim on an agreement between 
source and reporter—exactly the facts rejected by the Minnesota 
courts. 
Finally, the distinction between fact and law does not save stare 
decisis. The distinction between fact and law, while once true, is no 
longer so clear. The First Restatement of Judgments applied issue 
preclusion purely to questions of fact,66 a rule the Supreme Court 
followed as well.67 More modern doctrine has changed this 
approach. Under the Second Restatement, issue preclusion is 
 
 64. See Barrett, supra note 11, at 1020; Lea Brilmayer, The Sociology of Article III: A 
Response to Professor Brilmayer: A Reply, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1727, 1728–29 (1980). 
 65. See Lindquist & Cross, supra note 51, at 1203–05 (“Our research suggests that 
precedent has some constraining effect on judicial decisions, but not that precedent is the 
overriding determinant. Precedent appears to have a moderately constraining effect on judicial 
freedom.”). 
 66. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942); Geoffrey C. Hazard, 
Preclusion as to Issues of Law, 70 IOWA L. REV. 81, 89 (1984) (explaining the historic 
development of preclusion of issues of law). 
 67. In United States v. Moser, the plaintiff had entered the Naval Academy during the 
Civil War and had successfully argued in previous litigation that this service constituted 
“service during the civil war” within the meaning of a statute providing increased benefits for 
veterans meeting that requirement. 266 U.S. 236, 240 (1924). When he again brought suit 
for enhanced benefits, the Court found this decision preclusive because while preclusion “does 
not apply to unmixed questions of law . . . a fact, question or right distinctly adjudged in the 
original action cannot be disputed in a subsequent action.” Id. at 242 (emphasis omitted). The 
Court did not explain how to draw the line between the “unmixed question of law” and the 
“fact, question, or right.” See id. The Court’s opinion in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. 
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948), further struggled with these issues. In Sunnen, the taxpayer had 
assigned royalties from patents to his wife in a series of contracts and had succeeded in previous 
litigation in avoiding tax liability for the royalties on those patents. Id. at 595–96. The 
Supreme Court, though, viewed each contract as involving “separable” facts making preclusion 
inappropriate. Id. at 601. This separable facts doctrine has received substantial criticism. See 18 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 46, § 4425. 
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available whether the question is factual or legal.68 The Supreme 
Court has followed the Second Restatement and applied issue 
preclusion to unmixed questions of law.69 The Court reached the 
Second Restatement result in United States v. Stauffer Chemical 
Co.70 In Stauffer, the Environmental Protection Agency had 
attempted to inspect one of the defendant’s plants in Tennessee 
using private contractors along with EPA employees.71 The Clean Air 
Act72 only permitted “authorized representatives” to participate in 
inspections,73 and Stauffer contended that private contractors were 
not within the scope of the statute.74 Stauffer previously had litigated 
this question successfully against the EPA with respect to an 
inspection in Wyoming.75 The Supreme Court found preclusion to 
be appropriate, recognizing that “the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
can apply to preclude relitigation of both issues of law and issues of 
fact.”76 
Similarly, courts frequently apply a version of stare decisis to 
certain types of factual decisions.77 The clearest example of facts 
 
 68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). “[T]he phrase ‘issue of fact 
or law’ has been substituted for ‘question of fact’ so that the Section is now applicable to 
questions of law and law application as well as questions of fact.” Id. § 27 Reporter’s Notes. 
 69. In Montana v. United States, the Court held that, having sponsored state court 
litigation over the constitutionality of a state tax, the United States was issue precluded in 
federal court. 440 U.S. 147, 156–62 (1979). The Court accepted the Second Restatement’s 
limitation on preclusion “when issues of law arise in successive actions involving unrelated 
subject matter.” Id. at 162–63; see also Barrett, supra note 11, at 1050. 
 70. 464 U.S. 165 (1984). 
 71. Id. at 166. 
 72. See 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2) (2006); Stauffer, 464 U.S. at 166. 
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2). 
 74. Stauffer, 464 U.S. at 166. 
 75. Id. at 166–67. This outcome further highlights the close relationship between 
preclusion and stare decisis in the context of the absolutely binding nature of circuit precedent. 
The first lawsuit between the parties was in the Tenth Circuit. Stauffer Chem. Co. v. EPA, 647 
F.2d 1075 (10th Cir. 1981). The second suit took place in the Sixth Circuit. United States v. 
Stauffer Chem. Co., 684 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1982). Had the first suit also taken place in the 
Sixth Circuit, there would have been no question of preclusion. The EPA, Stauffer Chemical, 
and everyone else in the circuit simply would have been bound by the decision. 
 76. Stauffer, 464 U.S. at 170–71. The Court left open the possibility that the Moser 
exception survives but was critical of it: “Admittedly the purpose underlying the exception for 
‘unmixed questions of law’ . . . is far from clear. But whatever its purpose or extent, we think 
that there is no reason to apply it here . . . .” Id. at 172. 
 77. See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. One 25,900 Square Foot More or Less 
Parcel of Land, 766 F.2d 685, 689 (2d Cir. 1985) (concluding that court was bound by a 
prior determination that the parcel of land had access to a public road); see also 18 WRIGHT ET 
AL., supra note 46, § 4449 n.30 (discussing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.). 
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serving as precedent is what Kenneth Culp Davis initially identified 
as “legislative facts,” those not relating to the immediate parties but 
instead underlying the decisions about law and policy.78 The classic 
example of legislative fact may be the use of the social science data 
relating to the effect of segregation on African-American children in 
Brown v. Board of Education.79 The determination that segregation 
has negative consequences is indisputably factual, but certainly binds 
nonparties. The clearest demonstration of this comes from the cases 
in which Southern courts attempted to “revisit” the facts underlying 
the social science data and conclude, on preclusion grounds, that 
school systems not parties to Brown were not bound by the factual 
decision, an argument correctly rejected by the court of appeals.80 
Brown is not an outlier; courts often treat prior conclusions about 
social science data as binding.81 It is hard to see how we could 
interpret these holdings as legal in any coherent way. 
Both the flexibility and law-versus-fact justifications suffer from a 
more significant flaw. Courts have not offered a coherent theoretical 
explanation as to why they deserve such different treatment. In the 
case of flexibility, stare decisis is certainly designed to have an impact 
on nonparties. The point of the doctrine is to make relitigation of 
previously decided issues more difficult, and as a result, the doctrine 
only escapes constitutional suspicion to the extent that it does not 
serve its purposes. Similarly, courts have not explained why factual 
and legal questions should be treated so differently. From the point 
 
 78. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative 
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–04 (1942). 
 79. 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954). For articles discussing the Brown use of social 
science data as an example of a legislative fact, see, e.g., Bryan L. Adamson, Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 52(A) as an Ideological Weapon?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1025, 1061 (2007); 
Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535, 
1556–57 (1998); John Monahan et al., Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The 
Ascendance of “Social Frameworks,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1720–21 (2008) (“Judicial 
acceptance of social science research as a form a legislative fact was most famously embodied in 
Brown v. Board of Education.”). 
 80. See Stell v. Savannah-Chatam County Bd. of Educ., 220 F. Supp. 667, 680 (S.D. 
Ga. 1963), rev’d, 333 F.2d 55, 61 (5th Cir. 1964) (“[T]he District Court was bound by the 
decision of the Supreme Court in Brown. We reiterate that no inferior federal court may refrain 
from acting as required by that decision even if such a court should conclude that the Supreme 
Court erred either as to its facts or as to the law.”). 
 81. See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal 
Precedent, 76 CAL. L. REV. 877, 885 (1988); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social 
Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 562 (1987) (collecting 
cases). 
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of view of the losing litigant, the effect of the doctrines works 
identically. Both bar a party from arguing a position based on the 
result of prior lawsuit to which he was not a party. 
In Part III, I try to fill this theoretical gap. While the Court has 
never used it, we have a well-established doctrinal framework we can 
use to preserve stare decisis. Both the flexibility and the law-fact 
distinction fit well into the Supreme Court’s test from Mathews v. 
Eldridge,82 which gives us a mechanism to weigh the value of 
additional procedures against their costs. 
III. SAVING STARE DECISIS 
Despite these arguments, Taylor cannot mark the end of stare 
decisis. The Court explicitly relies on the ongoing value of stare 
decisis as a justification for its decisions in Taylor and Richards, using 
the theory that the stare decisis effect of a ruling will prevent the 
possibility of frivolous and burdensome litigation.83 Viewed through 
the narrow lens of the due process analysis in preclusion cases, 
however, stare decisis appears to have serious constitutional 
problems. 
Mathews v. Eldridge is the saving grace for stare decisis. The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews analyzed procedural due 
process through the lens of a cost-benefit analysis.84 Mathews requires 
courts to consider the private interest affected by the court’s 
decision, the risk of an erroneous deprivation as a result of the 
procedures that are in place, the added value that would be provided 
by any additional process, and the Government’s interest, including 
the cost of additional process.85 Additional process is only required 
when the increased likelihood of a correct outcome outweighs the 
cost of the process.86 This Part outlines when the Mathews test 
applies and why applying Mathews to preclusion and stare decisis 
 
 82. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 83. Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2178 (2008) (“[S]tare decisis will allow courts 
swiftly to dispose of repetitive suits brought in the same circuit.”); Richards v. Jefferson 
County, 517 U.S. 793, 805 (1996) (“A state court’s freedom to rely on prior precedent in 
rejecting a litigant’s claims does not afford it similar freedom to bind a litigant to a prior 
judgment to which he was not a party.”). 
 84. 424 U.S. at 334–35. For an excellent recent summary of Mathews, see Alexander 
Blair-Stanek, Understanding Bell Atlantic v. Twombly as Mathews v. Eldridge Applied to 
Discovery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1, 8–16 (forthcoming 2010).  
 85. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 86. Id. at 348. 
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explains our differential treatment of the impact of prior decisions on 
nonparties.87 
A. When Mathews Applies 
Mathews, of course, is not universally applicable to all questions 
of due process under the Constitution, even though the Court has 
described it as “a general approach for testing challenged state 
procedures”88 under the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court 
has never clearly outlined which type of due process questions are 
subject to the Mathews calculation. For instance, the Court has 
rejected claims that Mathews applies, as a general matter, in the 
criminal context or in the context for military courts-martial.89 Even 
in some civil contexts, the Court has refused to apply Mathews.90  
However, in order to save stare decisis, we do not need a broad 
theory outlining when the Mathews factors apply. We simply need to 
know that it applies in cases where nonparties lose important legal 
rights without being present. The Supreme Court has already 
accepted arguments that Mathews applies to these facts in 
Connecticut v. Doehr.91 Doehr is the capstone case in the Supreme 
Court’s preliminary remedies jurisprudence. Over the course of two 
 
 87. Mathews has frequently been subject to academic criticism. Professor Mashaw 
immediately critiqued the overly utilitarian nature of the Mathews balancing, arguing that the 
Due Process Clause reflected values other than a purely functional ideal. See Jerry L. Mashaw, 
The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. 
Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 50–51 (1976). If 
one takes this view, of course, my proposed save for stare decisis is unsuccessful. The more 
rigorous a due process standard one imposes, the more endangered stare decisis becomes. 
 88. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599 (1979). 
 89. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (military); Medina v. 
California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992) (criminal). Weiss and Medina both suggest that the 
decision not to apply Mathews arises out of concerns of deference. In both cases, the Supreme 
Court selected a less restrictive standard than Mathews in order to defer to legislative expertise. 
See Weiss, 510 U.S. at 177 (“Judicial deference thus ‘is at its apogee’ when reviewing 
congressional decisionmaking in [the military context].”) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 
U.S. 57, 70 (1981)); Medina, 505 U.S. at 445–46 (“[B]ecause the States have considerable 
expertise in matters of criminal procedure and the criminal process is grounded in centuries of 
common-law tradition, it is appropriate to exercise substantial deference to legislative 
judgments in this area.”). No such deference argument applies in the stare decisis context.  
 90. In the case of due process challenges to the sufficiency of the notice provided to a 
defendant, the Supreme Court has retained a more flexible rule of reasonableness rather than 
the three-prong analysis from Mathews. See, e.g., Dusnebery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 
168 (2007) (“[W]e have never viewed Mathews as announcing an all-embracing test for 
deciding due process claims.”). 
 91. 501 U.S. 1 (1991).  
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decades, the Supreme Court refined its analysis of when parties could 
be deprived of their rights without notice and a hearing.  
Starting with Sniadach v. Family Finance,92 the Court found that 
due process prohibited certain types of ex parte preliminary remedies. 
While the doctrine wandered through a series of cases,93 Doehr 
eventually concludes that the three-prong Mathews test governs these 
types of cases. 
Doehr involved a challenge to Connecticut’s ex parte lien 
procedure, which allowed plaintiffs to attach real property owned by 
the defendant upon submission of an affidavit demonstrating 
probable cause to “sustain the validity of the plaintiff’s claims.”94 The 
Court used the Mathews framework to invalidate the process.95 First, 
the Court found that the temporary cloud placed on the landowner’s 
title constituted a deprivation of property under the meaning of the 
Due Process Clause.96 Next, the Court accepted the argument that 
the risk of erroneous deprivation was high, since the court issuing 
the lien could only review a one-sided complaint and affidavit. Even 
though the state provided additional protections, including a quick 
postattachment hearing, judicial review, and a double damages 
remedy in case of error, the lack of a preattachment hearing was fatal 
to the statute.97 Finally, the Court concluded that the plaintiff’s lack 
of a preexisting interest in the property, as well as the absence of any 
exigent circumstances, gave him too limited an interest in obtaining 
the remedy without notice and a hearing.98  
The decision in Doehr to apply the Mathews framework in the 
context of preliminary remedies strongly suggests that it is 
 
 92. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). 
 93. Sniadach itself appears to apply a set of rules that varies based on the nature of the 
property: “[W]ages . . . [are] a specialized type of property.” Id. at 340. Fuentes v. Shevin, in 
contrast, explicitly states that notice and prior hearing are always required absent 
“extraordinary situations.” 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972). Just two years later, though, the Court 
upheld a preliminary remedies statute lacking a preattachment hearing on facts virtually 
identical to those of Fuentes. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974). Finally, in 
1975, the Court again disapproved of a statute based on the absence of adequate state 
procedures. See N. Ga. Finishing v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1978). The decision to apply 
Mathews here was almost certainly an attempt to clean up precedent that was very difficult to 
reconcile. 
 94. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 5. 
 95. Id. at 10. 
 96. Id. at 11–12. 
 97. Id. at 12–15. 
 98. Id. at 16. 
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appropriate to judge stare decisis and preclusion under the same 
standard. All three of these situations involve a court’s determination 
about the rights of parties who do not appear before them. In the 
preliminary remedies context, the resolution of the rights of the 
absent party is precisely the point of the proceeding, while in stare 
decisis and preclusion, the impact on nonparties is a collateral effect 
of the original judgment. 
Indeed, if anything, the due process concerns surrounding stare 
decisis and issue preclusion are potentially more troubling than those 
that arise in the preliminary remedies cases. Doehr and its 
predecessors make clear that due process is implicated even when the 
initial determination is reversible at a later post-seizure hearing. The 
existence of a later opportunity to relitigate the court’s order is 
relevant to the due process calculation under the Mathews analysis, 
but it is not determinative.  
B. Applying Mathews 
How does Mathews help explain the difference between the 
binding effect of stare decisis and issue preclusion? The difference 
cannot lie in the first step relating to the interest affected by the 
decision. The party denied victory in the second lawsuit due to the 
outcome of the first lawsuit is affected exactly the same way 
regardless of the label applied to the type of preclusion. Nor is there 
a difference in the second Mathews step. Additional process is hardly 
more likely to correct a prior erroneous decision as a matter of 
preclusion than as a matter of stare decisis. In fact, there is every 
reason to believe the opposite is true, especially in questions of 
historical fact. Revisiting issues will often achieve error correction in 
the context of precedent but not preclusion. Consider a classic 
example of issue preclusion involving a three-car accident and a 
factual question about whether a traffic light was red or green. If two 
drivers litigate the question of the color of the light to a decision, 
that factual question will not preclude the third driver in a later 
lawsuit. Even though memories fade and evidence might disappear in 
the interim, the third driver will be permitted to relitigate the 
question of the color of the light in a lawsuit brought years later. As 
a general matter, however, it is not much more difficult for a court 
to reconsider a pure question of law years after the question first 
arose. Viewed through the lens of the second Mathews prong, issue 
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preclusion and precedent may be exactly reversed in their effect on 
third parties.99  
Instead, the difference must lie in the third prong—the private or 
governmental interest. The third prong of Mathews focuses on the 
government or private interest in not providing additional process. 
Some of the classic benefits usually ascribed to stare decisis do not 
successfully distinguish precedent and preclusion. For instance, stare 
decisis can be seen as a theory protecting institutional legitimacy by 
building confidence in courts through preventing different outcomes 
in similar cases,100 or as a mechanism of judicial efficiency, allowing 
courts to avoid relitigating issues when the outcome is likely to be 
the same the second time around.101 Neither of these arguments, 
though, distinguishes precedent and preclusion. If courts lose 
legitimacy from inconsistent decisions, the cost should be the same 
regardless of the label applied to the inconsistency. If courts can save 
costs by avoiding relitigation of issues, the savings is identical for 
both preclusion and precedent.102  
 
 99. I thank Margaret Lemos for this insight.  
 100. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992); Moragne v. 
States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) (identifying as a goal of stare decisis “the 
necessity of maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned 
judgments”). Cf. Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional Circularity, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1, 27 
(2002) (reading Casey’s language about judicial integrity as “related to but independent of 
principles of stare decisis”).  
 101. See, e.g., Moragne, 398 U.S at 403 (stare decisis furthers “fair and expeditious 
adjudication by eliminating the need to relitigate every relevant proposition in every case”); 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921) (“[T]he labor 
of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be 
reopened in every case.”); William S. Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of 
Constitutional Stare Decisis: Casey, Dickerson and the Consequences of Pragmatic 
Adjudications, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 53, 54 (2002); Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Economic 
Perspective: An Economic Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Doctrine of Precedent, 78 N.C. L. REV. 
643, 648 (2000); Robert von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARV. L. 
REV. 409, 410 (1924). This argument, of course, requires the cost of revisiting the issue to be 
balanced against the cost of researching precedent. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING 
LAW 125 (1999).  
 102. Indeed, these are standard arguments made in favor of issue preclusion when cases 
involve the same parties. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (“[R]es judicata and 
collateral estoppel relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial 
resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.”); 
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 46, § 
4403.  
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One standard justification of stare decisis does usefully 
distinguish preclusion and precedent: the value of reliance.103 From 
this standpoint, the binding nature of precedent on third parties is 
precisely the point. In order to induce reliance on court decisions 
through the operation of stare decisis, we are willing to accept the 
increased impact on nonparties’ abilities to challenge those 
decisions.104 Precisely because decisions do not bind nonparties 
generally, due process prohibits case-by-case exceptions. Drawing 
this line between preclusion and precedent recognizes that the 
distinction is mostly a matter of labels.105 Decisions for which it is 
valuable to bind nonparties earn the label of precedent. Decisions for 
which it is not valuable to bind nonparties are merely preclusive. 
Noting the difference in terminology, though, does not answer 
the functional question. For which types of court decisions is the 
value of binding nonparties sufficiently high that it overcomes the 
due process bar? A full typology is impossible, of course, but one 
central result involves the number of nonparties affected. When a 
 
 103. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 856 (1992); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 
(1991); Moragne, 398 U.S. at 403. 
 104. Courts have recognized a wide range of interests under the third Mathews prong as 
supporting a reduced right to process. The first category of interest that courts have 
recognized as undermining the need for additional process is the simple cost of that process. 
Procedure is not free, and gains in accuracy come at an administrative cost. Along these lines, 
the Court recently rejected a challenge to Ohio’s process for designating inmates for solitary 
confinement without the opportunity to call witnesses in a pre-designation hearing, in part 
because of the expense of providing more extensive procedural opportunities. Wilkinson v. 
Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 227 (2005); see also Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715 (2003). A 
second common justification for a reduction in process is exigency. In Doehr, the Court 
recognized that in cases where additional process poses a risk that the burdened party will 
endure additional injury in the interim, deprivation without a hearing may be appropriate. 
Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 16 (1991). Similarly, in Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 
(1997), the Court recognized that the need to quickly remove a police officer facing criminal 
charges justified a lack of a preremoval hearing. Finally, on occasion, courts have recognized a 
version of reliance as supporting reduced process in the third Mathews step. See Grayson v. 
King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1342 (11th Cir. 2006) (governmental interest in finality at third 
Mathews step); Foss v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 589–90 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(finding the government had an interest in establishing strict application deadlines for access to 
a fisheries pool in order to maintain predictability and a stable market value). 
 105. The Seventh Circuit has expressed a version of this view: “It is res judicata that bars 
the same party from relitigating a case after final judgment . . . . It is stare decisis that bars a 
different party from obtaining the overruling of a decision. The existence of different parties is 
assumed by the doctrine, rather than being something . . . outside its reach.” Bethesda 
Lutheran Homes & Servs., Inc. v. Born, 238 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations 
omitted); see also Barrett, supra note 11, at 1041 (noting that Bethesda “asserts that the whole 
point of stare decisis is to function as a kind of nonparty preclusion”).  
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court decision can affect a large number of nonparties, thus 
potentially inducing reliance, the label “precedent” and the resulting 
nonparty preclusion make sense.106 When a decision only matters to a 
small group, there is little value in binding nonparties because few 
nonparties will rely on the result. This analysis explains the difference 
between the treatment of historical facts and legislative facts. 
Consider the traffic light example discussed earlier. In that example, 
the only other person with an interest in the result is the third party 
bringing a later lawsuit; there is little, if any, reliance benefit in 
making the prior decision binding. By contrast, the decisions on 
social science data in Brown bind widely and induce reliance as a 
result.  
Indeed, the Court has already adopted a version of this analysis 
in some of its earliest jurisprudence on procedural due process, 
arising in the context of administrative law. In Bi-Metallic Investment 
Co. v. State Board of Equalization107 and Londoner v. City and 
County of Denver,108 the Court wrestled with the application of 
procedural due process to local administrative decision-making. In 
Londoner, the Court struck down a property tax assessment for street 
improvements where those affected by the tax did not receive notice 
or a hearing.109 In contrast, in Bi-Metallic, the Court rejected a due 
process challenge to a broad-based increase in the valuation of all 
property, establishing a rule that due process rights are reduced 
when the deprivation applies broadly rather than narrowly.110 
“Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people, it is 
impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its 
adoption. . . . There must be a limit to individual argument in such 
matters if government is to go on.”111 Bi-Metallic thus represents a 
very early example of Mathews balancing.112 When the costs of 
 
 106. In the related context of the law-fact distinction, Ronald J. Allen and Michael S. 
Pardo draw a similar line between “matters of general import and highly specific and localized 
phenomena.” Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1770 (2002). 
 107. 239 U.S. 441 (1915). 
 108. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).  
 109. Id. at 386. 
 110. 239 U.S. at 444. 
 111. Id. at 445. The Court distinguished Londoner precisely because it established a legal 
rule that applied narrowly to a small group of people rather than broadly. Id. 
 112. Some courts incorrectly describe Bi-Metallic as establishing a rule that due process 
protections simply do not apply to broad-based policy decisions. See Jackson Court  
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additional process are too high, deprivation can take place without 
allowing a hearing. The value of a broad rule of behavior applying 
generally overpowers the individual right of personalized 
adjudication. Similarly, when court decisions apply broadly and the 
reliance values are high, we treat them as precedent rather than 
merely preclusive. 
Aside from the number of nonparties affected by the decision, 
Taylor itself recognizes that particular substantive areas of law may 
involve heightened reliance interests. Although the Taylor Court did 
not explicitly discuss its due process analysis in terms of Mathews, the 
Court’s six exceptions to the general rule of nonparty preclusion can 
be seen as an application of the Mathews framework.113 In three of 
the Taylor categories (litigation by proxy, assumption of control, and 
adequate representation), the nonparty being precluded received 
additional process when compared to the ordinary nonparty, 
indicating a reduced due process concern under the second Mathews 
prong, while a party agreeing to be bound waives his due process 
rights. In the last two categories, involving cases of a preexisting 
substantive legal relationship between the nonparty and a party, i.e., 
those in privity with a party, and those involving specialized statutory 
schemes, such as probate or bankruptcy, reliance is the central notion 
that permits nonparty preclusion. As the Court notes, the need to 
bind those in privity with parties arose in order to establish clear title 
to property.114 Nonparties in privity are not bound because they 
received additional process; they are bound because the societal value 
in binding them is increased compared to the ordinary case. The 
 
Condos., Inc. v. New Orleans, 874 F.2d 1070, 1074 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[I]t is well established 
law that once an action is characterized as legislative, procedural due process requirements do 
not apply.”); U.S. Labor Party v. Oremus, 619 F.2d 683, 690 (7th Cir. 1980) (“No process is 
required where, as here, a legislative enactment is used to affect the property of an 
individual.”); Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 693 (3d Cir. 1980) (“Long ago, the 
Supreme Court decided that the protections of procedural due process do not extend to 
legislative actions.”). Bi-Metallic, though, is explicit in holding that due process requirements 
apply but are met through the political process rather than individual adjudication. 239 U.S. at 
445; see also O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Home, 447 U.S. 773, 802 (1980) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring) (applying Mathews-style balancing in connection with Bi-Metallic). 
 113. Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2172–74 (2008). 
 114. The privity exceptions “originated ‘as much from the needs of property law as from 
the values of preclusion by judgment.’” Id. at 2172 (quoting 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 
46, § 4448). Wright and Miller go on to explain that “[i]n each case, the underlying analysis 
begins with the requirements of sound property relationships. Preclusion is extended or denied 
in an effort to protect conflicting property interests rather than an effort to implement 
concepts of participation or representation.” Id. 
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specialized statutory schemes such as probate and bankruptcy are 
similar in that they involved increased reliance interests. Both are 
designed to extinguish all claims on the probate or bankruptcy estate 
in a fixed period of time and because of this enhanced reliance value, 
the decisions are allowed to bind nonparties.  
This notion of nonparty reliance as the central purpose of stare 
decisis appears in the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure as well. Federal Rules 19 and 24 contain virtually identical 
language that the federal courts have interpreted very differently. 
Rule 19 governs compulsory party joinder: a person is “required to 
be joined if feasible” if, among other requirements, the person 
“claims an interest relating to the action and is so situated that 
disposing of the action in the person’s absence may as a practical 
matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect the 
interest.”115 Rule 24(a) governs intervention as a matter of right: the 
court must permit a person to intervene who “claims an interest 
relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the 
action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a 
practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its 
interest.”116 The current versions of both rules were adopted in 1966 
and were consciously drafted to use identical language.117  
Under both Rule 19 and Rule 24, parties have argued that the 
stare decisis effect of having a lawsuit proceed in their absence would 
impair their ability to protect their interests. Under Rule 24, this 
argument has succeeded in multiple circuits.118 This split in authority 
 
 115. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1). 
 116. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). 
 117. FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee’s note; FED. R. CIV. P. 19 advisory 
committee’s note; Benjamin Kaplan, The Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 400 (1967). 
 118. See Huber v. Taylor, 532 F.3d 237, 250 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he requirements of 
Rule 19(a) are not satisfied simply because a judgment against Defendants in this action might 
set a persuasive precedent in any potential future action . . . .”); Schulman v. J.P. Morgan Inv. 
Mgmt., Inc., 35 F.3d 799, 805 (3d Cir. 1994); Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. v. Shepard 
Niles, Inc., 11 F.3d 399, 407 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[W]e are not inclined to hold that any 
potential effect the doctrine [of stare decisis] may have on an absent party’s rights makes the 
absent party’s joinder compulsory . . . .”); NGV Gaming, Ltd. v. Upstream Point Molate, 
LLC, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Bellaire Corp. v. Apfel, No. C-2-99-532, 2000 
WL 33910112, at *2 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (“[T]he threat of negative precedent is not enough to 
require compulsive joinder.”). But see Pulitzer-Polster v. Pulitzer, 784 F.2d 1305, 1310 (5th 
Cir. 1986). The cases relying on the effect of stare decisis as grounds for joinder under Rule 19 
often involve other additional factors indicating that the decision might have an impact on the 
nonparty. See Acton Co. v. Bachman Foods, 668 F.2d 76, 78 (1st Cir. 1982) (combination of 
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makes little sense from a textual standpoint, but is perfectly 
reasonable given the purpose of stare decisis as a doctrine of 
inducing nonparty reliance. Allowing a nonparty to join a lawsuit 
based on the potential precedential effect recognizes the real 
consequences of stare decisis, but treating a nonparty as required due 
to the stare decisis impact of a judgment is nonsensical since the 
central purpose of stare decisis is to have precisely such an effect. 
IV. DUE PROCESS CONSTRAINTS ON STARE DECISIS  
So what? When you started reading this Article, you probably 
thought stare decisis was constitutional and you (perhaps) have been 
convinced that you were right. The focus on Mathews and the role of 
due process, though, changes the framework through which we see 
stare decisis. Two implications flow from the Mathews analysis. First, 
as argued above, the key difference between preclusion and 
precedent comes at the third step, through the value of nonparty 
reliance. We accept the impact on third parties as part of the effort to 
create legal rules on which people can rely. This result means, 
though, that reliance takes a new central role. In particular, the 
Supreme Court has traditionally viewed reliance as a discretionary 
policy concern. However, when seen through the lens of Mathews, 
reliance becomes mandatory. Unless the decision in the first suit can 
and does induce nonparty reliance, stare decisis and preclusion are 
not different and precedent can run afoul of the due process clause. 
Stare decisis cannot be saved in cases where reliance is low.  
Second, if due process constrains both precedent and preclusion, 
in situations where parties may raise due process challenges to the 
binding effects of judgments, nonparties must be able to challenge 
their precedential effect. Specifically, we generally permit parties to 
obtain relief from judgments issued by judges who were corrupt. I 
examine the application of this anticorruption rule in connection 
with two famous cases of judicial bribery: the Martin Manton scandal 
on the Second Circuit in the 1930s and the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court bribery scandal of the 1960s.119 
 
preclusion and stare decisis); Rotella v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., No. 3:08-CV-0486-G, 2008 
WL 5272787, at *2 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (combination of stare decisis and preclusion); Tycom 
Corp. v. Redactron Corp., 380 F. Supp. 1183, 1190 (D. Del. 1974) (combination of stare 
decisis and contractual rights). 
 119. Of course, these are hardly the only changes that might result from an explicit focus 
on reliance interests. See Barrett, supra note 11, at 1063–64 (noting that reliance interests 
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A. Reliance, Stare Decisis, and Due Process 
The idea that stare decisis is closely linked to reliance is hardly a 
new concept. Reliance is one of the standard and oldest justifications 
for the binding effect of precedent. Nineteenth-century case law 
tended to focus on reliance in the context of property and contract 
law. Historical analysis has identified this trend in the stare decisis 
tradition of both the United States Supreme Court120 and state 
courts.121 More recently, the Supreme Court’s decision in Casey 
recognized the importance of noneconomic societal reliance. “[F]or 
two decades of economic and social developments, people have 
organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their 
views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the 
availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail.”122 
Since Casey, the Supreme Court has continued to identify societal 
reliance as a relevant factor in the stare decisis calculation. The 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the ongoing vitality of Miranda v. 
Arizona123 in Dickerson v. United States124 based on its widespread 
societal acceptance.125 In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court 
overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,126 relying in part on the absence of 
noneconomic reliance.127  
 
might vary based on which court issued an opinion and the extent to which a decision conflicts 
with prior precedent).  
 120. See Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to 
the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 645, 699 (1999).  
 121. See Polly J. Price, A Constitutional Significance for Precedent: Originalism, Stare 
Decisis and Property Rights, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 113, 119 (2007) (“The evidence here 
suggests that most state judges in the formative era did consider judicial abandonment of 
precedent potentially to be a retroactive impairment of property rights.”).  
 122. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).  
 123. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 124. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 125. Id. at 443 (“We do not think there is such justification for overruling Miranda. 
Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings 
have become part of our national culture.”). Similarly, in Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 
(2006), the Court refused to overrule Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), on the theory that 
Congress and state legislatures relied on the decision in drafting legislation.  
 126. 478 U.S. 186 (1985). 
 127. 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (“The holding of Bowers, however, has not induced 
detrimental reliance comparable to some instances where recognized individual rights are 
involved. Indeed, there has been no individual or societal reliance on Bowers of the sort that 
could counsel against overturning its holding once there are compelling reasons to do so.”).  
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This notion of noneconomic-societal reliance has been the 
subject of much academic discussion128—a dispute outside the scope 
of this Article. Regardless of the type of interest that counts for 
reliance purposes, the central result of a due process view on 
precedent is that reliance is mandatory for applying stare decisis, 
rather than a discretionary factor in the decision of whether to 
overrule a prior case. The Supreme Court has generally discussed 
reliance as one of the special justifications counseling against 
overruling prior erroneous decisions.129 A due process framework 
takes stare decisis and elevates it. Rather than failing to overrule 
incorrect decisions if reliance exists, courts need to ask if reliance is 
present before allowing an erroneous decision to bind.  
In order to see the effect of this changed perspective, consider 
two decisions widely viewed as wrongly decided, but followed on a 
stare decisis theory even though reliance is absent. In Marshall v. 
Marshall130 and Ankenbrandt v. Richards,131 the Supreme Court 
recently evaluated the probate and domestic relations exceptions to 
federal jurisdiction. In both cases, the Court was confronted with 
dubious old precedent, which it accepted primarily based on stare 
decisis. In 1859, the Supreme Court had stated in Barber v. Barber, 
“We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United 
States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of 
alimony.”132 Similarly, in the 1946 decision in Markham v. Allen, the 
Supreme Court denied federal courts “jurisdiction to probate a will 
 
 128. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 93 (2004); 
Consovoy, supra note 101, at 64; Tom Hardy, Note, Has Mighty Casey Struck Out?: Societal 
Reliance and the Supreme Court’s Modern Stare Decisis Analysis, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
591, 594 (2006). 
 129. See Randall, 548 U.S. at 244 (stating that “[d]eparture from precedent is 
exceptional and requires ‘special justification’” and identifying reliance as one factor to 
consider); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–61 (1992) (listing reliance along 
with workability, undermining by subsequent cases, and changed facts as one of many factors 
to consider in the stare decisis analysis); Moragne v. States Marine Lines Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 
403 (1969). 
 130. 547 U.S. 293 (2006). Marshall arguably did not approve the probate exception. 
The Supreme Court instead assumed a probate exception existed but decided that the case 
before fell outside the scope of any such exception. Id. at 308. Despite this approach, the 
circuits have read Marshall as reaffirming the existence of a probate exception and have 
dismissed cases as a result. See, e.g., Three Keys Ltd. v. SR Util. Holding Co., 540 F.3d 220, 
229 (3d Cir. 2008); Lefkowitz v. Bank of N.Y., 528 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 2007); Wisecarver 
v. Moore, 489 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 2007).  
 131. 504 U.S. 689 (1992).  
 132. 62 U.S. 582, 584 (1858); see also Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 694. 
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or administer an estate.”133 As a matter of first impression, the 
traditional tools of statutory interpretation would suggest that these 
decisions are almost certainly incorrect. Both doctrines establish free-
floating exceptions to federal court jurisdiction. However, the 
jurisdictional statutes in both cases (like all of the federal 
jurisdictional statutes) are written broadly,134 and do not include any 
exception for probate or domestic relations cases. The primary 
argument that this nontextual reading should control is that the 
1789 Judiciary Act was intended to exclude from the equity 
jurisdiction of the federal courts those matters in which the English 
chancery courts lacked jurisdiction.135 This claim, though, is very 
likely a misreading of English history.136  
Despite the weakness of the prior precedent, both Marshall and 
Ankenbrandt declined to overrule it on stare decisis grounds.137 
Explicitly in Ankenbrandt, and implicitly in Marshall, the Court 
viewed this decision as a policy choice,138 declining to find 
jurisdiction based on the “special proficiency”139 of state courts in 
resolving these types of matters. Neither case discusses any reliance 
 
 133. 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946); see also Marshall, 547 U.S. at 310. 
 134. Jurisdiction in Barber was based on the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006), 
while Markham was brought by officers of the United States, and thus jurisdiction was 
appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1345. See Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 491–92 (1946); 
Barber, 62 U.S. at 584. 
 135. See Marshall, 547 U.S. at 308; Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 699–700; Markham, 326 
U.S. at 494. 
 136. See Marshall, 547 U.S. at 316 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring) (pointing out that Bleak 
House discusses a probate case in chancery); Peter Nicolas, Fighting the Probate Mafia: A 
Dissection of the Probate Exception to Federal Court Jurisdiction, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1479, 1508 
(2001) (discussing history of chancery jurisdiction over probate cases); Naomi R. Cahn, Family 
Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV. 1073, 1089–90 (1994) (discussing 
history underlying domestic relations exception).  
 137. 547 U.S. at 308–09; 504 U.S. at 700. Both the probate and the domestic relations 
exemptions have been widely identified as cases where the Court veered from the traditional 
tools of statutory interpretation based on concerns of stare decisis. See, e.g., Peter J. Smith, 
Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1928 (2008) (noting both 
Ankenbrandt and Marshall are “atextual”); Nicolas, supra note 136, at 1483–85 (describing 
the rationale for the probate exception as “mired in confusion” and arguing for a legislative 
override); Wilson R. Huhn, Teaching Legal Analysis Using a Pluralistic Model of Law, 36 
GONZ. L. REV. 433, 471 (2001) (noting the “sharp conflict between text and precedent” in 
Ankenbrandt); Cahn, supra note 136, at 1083–87 (critiquing Ankenbrandt). 
 138. “Not only is our conclusion rooted in respect for this long-held understanding, it is 
also supported by sound policy considerations.” Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703; see also 
Marshall, 547 U.S. at 308. 
 139. Marshall, 547 U.S. at 308; Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704. 
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interest in the prior decision, and it would be difficult to take a claim 
about such reliance interest seriously. Whether viewed through an 
economic lens or a social reliance lens, it is difficult to imagine 
anyone shaping their conduct based on the absence of federal 
jurisdiction in these types of cases, either explicitly or as a 
background norm.140 Applying the Mathews analysis of due process, 
these cases become impossible to distinguish from issue preclusion. 
Due process prohibits binding nonparties to the decisions in Barber 
and Markham. While inducing reliance interests generally provides 
the public benefit that permits binding nonparties as a matter of stare 
decisis, such reliance is absent here, so precedent collapses into issue 
preclusion and due process prohibits it from binding. 
B. Stare Decisis, Due Process, and Corrupt Process 
Collapsing the distinction between preclusion and precedent also 
eliminates the distinction between those bound by the stare decisis 
impact of decisions and those bound directly by the judgment. When 
the process in the initial suit was corrupt, litigants cannot be bound 
by the judgment. For instance, the Supreme Court has made clear 
that when judges have a direct financial stake in the outcome of a 
case, due process prohibits their participation in the decision.141 
Quite sensibly, judgments made by judicial officers who accept 
bribes cannot be binding on litigants without running afoul of the 
Constitution. This section looks at the effect of those same decisions 
on nonlitigants, analyzing the stare decisis effects of corrupt 
decisions on nonparties. First, I examine the case of Martin Manton, 
a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit. Manton accepted bribes from litigants in a number of cases 
over a series of years. Second, I consider the bribery scandal on the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court that came to light in the mid-1960s, 
where multiple judges accepted payments for the deciding vote.  
 
 140. The Supreme Court in both Marshall and Ankenbrandt relied in part on the fact 
that Congress had failed to overrule the prior statutory interpretation. See Marshall, 547 U.S. 
at 307; Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703. Whatever validity this argument has generally, it is 
especially weak in cases involving jurisdictional statutes where Congress is very unlikely to pay 
much attention to the interpretation. Even if this argument is correct here, this is not a reliance 
argument, simply an argument that stare decisis does not apply. If Congress approves of the 
interpretation, it means that it was the correct reading of the statute, not that it should be 
followed even though it was in error.  
 141. See Aetna Ins. Co. v LaVoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824 (1986) (holding that judges with a 
direct, pecuniary interest in a case must be recused as a matter of due process).  
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I argue that, as the bribed decisions are invalid with respect to the 
parties before the court, they are equally invalid with respect to 
nonparties. 
1. Martin Manton 
Before the bribery scandal that led to his resignation, Martin 
Manton was one of the most influential judges in the country.142 His 
strong connections to the New York Tammany Hall machine led to 
early, prestigious judicial appointments.143 In 1916, President Wilson 
appointed Manton to the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York when he was only thirty-six, making 
him the youngest federal judge in the country.144 Eighteen months 
after his appointment to the district bench, he was elevated to the 
Second Circuit.145 In 1923, President Harding seriously considered 
Manton for the seat on the United States Supreme Court left open 
by the resignation of William Day.146 Members of both the bench 
and the bar strongly opposed the potential appointment. Judge 
Learned Hand and Chief Justice Taft both were openly negative 
about Manton and the Judiciary Committee of the Association of the 
Bar of the City of New York was unanimously against the 
appointment.147 In part due to this opposition, Harding appointed 
Pierce Butler instead.148 
Manton became the presiding judge of the Second Circuit after 
twelve years on the court.149 As a result of the Great Depression, 
Manton began to take out large loans from (among others) 
individuals with cases pending before the Circuit.150 “In the period 
 
 142. For general background on the Manton scandal, see, e.g., JOSEPH BORKIN, THE 
CORRUPT JUDGE: AN INQUIRY INTO BRIBERY AND OTHER HIGH CRIMES AND 
MISDEMEANORS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 25 (Potter 1962); GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED 
HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 503–13 (Knopf 1994); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 
567–71 (MacMillan 1984); and Allan T. Vestal, A Study In Perfidy, 35 IND. L.J. 17 (1959). 
 143. See GUNTHER, supra note 142, at 503; NOONAN, supra note 142, at 567. 
 144. NOONAN, supra note 142, at 567. 
 145. See GUNTHER, supra note 142, at 503; NOONAN, supra note 142, at 567. 
 146. See GUNTHER, supra note 142, at 503; NOONAN, supra note 142, at 567. 
 147. See GUNTHER, supra note 142, at 503; NOONAN, supra note 142, at 567. 
 148. See GUNTHER, supra note 142, at 503; NOONAN, supra note 142, at 567. 
 149. See Vestal, supra note 142, at 18.  
 150. Id. at 22. In 1934, Manton’s net worth increased by about $1.5 million dollars, 
turning $750,000 dollars in debt into $750,000 in assets. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 
GRAND INQUESTS 123 (1992).  
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1932–1938, Manton . . . received large sums of money from litigants 
in at least a dozen cases.”151 The Manton scandal initially broke on 
January 27, 1939, in an article in the New York World-Telegram.152 
Two days later, Thomas Dewey, the District Attorney for New York 
County, disclosed a letter he had sent to the Chair of the House 
Judiciary Committee, identifying six incidents since 1932 in which 
Manton received money from parties with cases pending before the 
circuit.153 Manton resigned almost immediately.154  
While resignation had customarily provided protection against 
charges,155 Manton was indicted in April 1939 for conspiracy to 
defraud the United States.156 The indictment identified six Second 
Circuit cases in which Manton had allegedly taken bribes from 
litigants.157 Manton was convicted after a short trial, was sentenced 
to two years in prison, and was fined.158 Due to the disqualification 
of most of the Second Circuit, a special panel was convened to hear 
Manton’s appeal.159 The Circuit affirmed160 and Manton served 
seventeen months in prison.161 
 
 151. NOONAN, supra note 142, at 568. The total amount of money at issue is unclear, 
with estimates ranging from $435,000 to $600,000. Id.; Vestal, supra note 142, at 41, n.156. 
 152. See GUNTHER, supra note 142, at 504.  
 153. See id.; Dewey Says Judge Manton Got $400,000 From Litigants; Sends Charges to 
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1939, at 1. Gunther suggests that Dewey sent the letter 
because the two-year statute of limitations on the potential state law charge, income tax 
evasion, would prevent prosecution on most of the payments. GUNTHER, supra note 142, at 
504.  
 154. Manton Quits as Federal Judge; Defends His Business Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
1939, at 1.  
 155. NOONAN, supra note 142, at 568.  
 156. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006); NOONAN, supra note 142, at 568; Vestal, supra note 142, 
at 40.  
 157. See BORKIN, supra note 142, at 44–45; Vestal, supra note 142, at 40. The six cases 
were Schick Dry Shaver, Inc. v. Dictograph Products Co., 89 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1937); United 
States ex rel. Lotsch v. Kelly, 86 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1936); Smith v. Hall, 83 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 
1936); General Motors Corp. v. Preferred Electric & Wire Corp., 79 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1935); 
Elec. Auto-Lite Co. v. P. & D. Manufacturing Co., 78 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1935); and Art Metal 
Works, Inc. v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 70 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1934). See United States v. 
Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1939). 
 158. GUNTHER, supra note 142, at 506. 
 159. The panel consisted of retired United States Supreme Court Justice George 
Sutherland, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, and Second Circuit Judge Charles E. Clark, who took 
the bench in March 1939, after Manton left the court. See Vestal, supra note 142, at 43 n.167; 
GUNTHER, supra note 142, at 505.  
 160. United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1939). 
 161. NOONAN, supra note 142, at 569. 
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After the scandal was revealed, the Second Circuit was 
confronted with the question of how to handle the cases in which 
Manton had taken bribes. The Court generally granted rehearing 
and reviewed the decision with a new panel.162 Substantial efforts 
were made to make whole those injured by the judicial misconduct. 
In Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Abraham & Straus, Inc.,163 Manton 
wrote an opinion holding that a patent holder forfeited its right to 
sue for patent infringement by overstating the holding in a prior 
decision in its favor.164 Manton had accepted a bribe from the 
victorious party on the day of the decision.165 The Second Circuit 
not only reversed the decision on rehearing,166 accepting Judge 
Learned Hand’s original dissenting opinion as the new opinion of 
the court, but Art Metal Works also successfully petitioned Congress 
for a seven-year extension of the patent term as a result of the delay 
between the 1932 initial decision and the 1939 reversal on 
rehearing.167 
But what about the stare decisis effect of the bribed decisions? 
Before the bribery was revealed, courts cited the decisions in which 
Manton took bribes, binding nonparties to the result. Consider, for 
example, Electric Auto-Lite Co. v. P. & D. Manufacturing Co., in 
which Manton accepted loans facilitated by counsel for P. & D. 
Manufacturing, the defendant accused of unfair competition and 
patent infringement.168 Electric Auto-Lite, of course, received 
rehearing when the scandal was revealed.169 In the interim, though, 
the decision was binding to the detriment of other litigants. In 
 
 162. See, e.g., Elec. Auto-Lite Co. v. P. & D. Mfg. Co., 78 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1935) on 
reh’g, 109 F.2d 566, 567 (2d Cir. 1940) (per curiam); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Preferred Elec. & 
Wire Corp., 79 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1935), on reh’g, 109 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1940) (per curiam); 
Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 70 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1934), on reh’g, 107 
F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1939). 
 163. 70 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1934). 
 164. Id. at 639–40. 
 165. GUNTHER, supra note 142, at 508. 
 166. Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 107 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1939). 
 167. See BORKIN, supra note 142, at 59; Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term 
Extension and the Constitution: A Historical Perspective, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC. 19, 73 & 
n.338 (2001).  
 168. See Vestal, supra note 142, at 31–32; United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 844 
(2d Cir. 1939). 
 169. Elec. Auto-Lite Co. v. P. & D. Mfg. Co., 109 F.2d 566 (2d. Cir. 1940) (per 
curiam). 
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Parrot Speed Fastener Corp. v. E.W. Carpenter Manufacturing Co.,170 
decided just days before the bribery scandal was revealed, a plaintiff 
in an unfair competition suit lost due to the precedential impact of 
Electric Auto-Lite.171 If due process would require that rehearing be 
granted to the plaintiff in Electric Auto-Lite itself, it should have the 
same result for those parties injured by the stare decisis impact of 
those decisions. 
In the end, a due process perspective on stare decisis likely would 
not change the result in Parrot Speed Fastener. Neither the result nor 
the legal theory in Electric Auto-Lite changed on rehearing.172 There 
is some reason to believe that the Second Circuit has adopted an 
informal rule to avoid relying on decisions where Manton’s vote 
made the difference.173 The result, of course, is not the central 
question. If we are not willing to accept binding litigants to decisions 
where judges were bribed, it makes little sense to bind nonparties 
based on stare decisis.  
2. Bribery in the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
The bribery scandal on the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which 
broke in the mid-1960s, has received less attention than the Manton 
scandal, but it was more serious in many ways. Over the course of 
 
 170. 26 F. Supp. 622 (D. Conn. 1939). 
 171. Id. at 623. 
 172. Parrot Speed Fastener relied on Electric Auto-Lite for the proposition that copying a 
product does not establish an unfair competition claim unless the purchaser is deceived. 26 F. 
Supp. at 623. On rehearing, the Second Circuit reaffirmed this proposition. See Elec. Auto-Lite, 
109 F.2d at 567 (“There is nothing unlawful in copying the unpatented products of another 
dealer down to the last detail, except in so far as the resulting similarity may become a means 
of securing his customers through their belief, so induced, that your goods are his.”). 
 173. See Mark V. Tushnet, Clarence Thomas: The Constitutional Problems, 63 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 466, 477 (1995) (book review) (“It is part of the lore of the Second Circuit 
that one should not cite cases in which Manton’s was the deciding vote.”); Benjamin Weiser, 
Hang Him Up? The Bad Judge and His Image, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at A1 (“In some 
ways, the legacy of Judge Manton has already been erased from the legal annals: two federal 
judges in Manhattan recalled that when they were law clerks, their judges admonished them 
never to cite Judge Manton’s opinions.”). If the rule exists, it is not honored consistently. The 
Second Circuit has on several occasions cited cases where Manton not only was the deciding 
vote, but wrote the opinion over a dissent. See, e.g., Blue Tree Hotels Inv. Can., Ltd. v. 
Starwood Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 369 F.3d 212, 224 n.9 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Biddle 
Purchasing Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n., 96 F.2d 687, 691 (2d Cir. 1938)); Itar-Tass Russian 
News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 140 F.3d 442, 448 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Brooks v. 
Mandel-Witte Co., 54 F.2d 992, 994 (2d Cir. 1932)); U.S. ex rel. Bergen Point Iron Works v. 
Md. Cas. Co., 384 F.2d 303, 304 (2d Cir. 1967) (citing Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 91 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1937)). 
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three decades, beginning in the 1930s, at least four Justices on 
Oklahoma’s highest court took bribes for favorable votes in cases.174 
In 1964 and 1965, Justice Nelson Corn confessed to accepting 
bribes on behalf of himself and colleagues in at least three cases175: 
Marshall v. Amos,176 Selected Investment Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax 
Commission,177 and Oklahoma Co. v. O’Neil.178 Justice Corn then 
passed on the funds he received to those colleagues on the court 
necessary to guarantee a favorable decision.179 
As was true in the cases where Manton accepted bribes, the court 
granted rehearing to those litigants directly affected by the bribes, 
but there was no consideration for those merely affected by the stare 
decisis effect of the decisions. Take, for instance, Oklahoma Co. v. 
O’Neil180 and Marshall v. Amos.181 In O’Neil, a group of Florida and 
Massachusetts investors had purchased shares of an Oklahoma oil 
and gas lease from the Oklahoma Company.182 The investors argued 
that they were entitled to rescind the purchase on the grounds that 
the husband-and-wife owners of the Oklahoma Company had 
fraudulently induced the investment by overstating the value of the 
leases.183 The trial court found for the investors but the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court reversed in a 5 to 4 decision, concluding that the 
investors were not entitled to make use of oral representations when 
there was a written contract.184 Justice Corn later confessed that the 
father of one of the owners of the Oklahoma Company paid him 
$7,500 and he shared the funds equally with two colleagues on the 
court, both of whom voted for reversal.185 After the bribery scandal 
 
 174. See Johnson v. Johnson, 424 P.2d 414 (Okla. 1967); WILLIAM A. BARRY & JAMES 
EDWIN ALEXANDER, JUSTICE FOR SALE: SHOCKING SCANDAL OF OKLAHOMA SUPREME 
COURT (1996); Malcom Hall, Note, Courts: Scandal in the Oklahoma Supreme Court, 20 
OKLA. L. REV. 417, 418 (1967); Oklahoma’s Shocking Scandal, TIME MAG., Apr. 16, 1965. 
The bribes were initially only paid for a sixth vote on the nine-judge court, but by the mid-
1950s, Justices were paid to decide cases outright. See Hall, supra at 418. 
 175. See BARRY & ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 158–59; Hall, supra note 174, at 418. 
 176. 300 P.2d 990 (Okla. 1955). 
 177. 309 P.2d 267 (Okla. 1957). 
 178. 333 P.2d 534 (Okla. 1958). 
 179. See BARRY & ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 4. 
 180. 333 P.2d 534 (Okla. 1958). 
 181. 300 P.2d 990 (Okla. 1955). 
 182. See O’Neil, 333 P.2d at 538; BARRY & ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 182. 
 183. See O’Neil, 333 P.2d at 538; BARRY & ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 182. 
 184. See O’Neil, 333 P.2d at 545–46; BARRY & ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 182. 
 185. See O’Neil, 333 P.2d at 545–46; BARRY & ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 183. 
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was revealed, the original decision was vacated and on rehearing, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision that 
the investment had been fraudulently induced.186  
Marshall v. Amos187 followed a similar path. The case also 
involved a fraud claim in connection with oil leases. The trial court 
concluded that the defendants had defrauded plaintiffs of their 
royalties and held that a constructive trust had been created for the 
benefit of the plaintiffs.188 The Supreme Court reversed, again in a 5 
to 4 decision, concluding that the standards for a constructive trust 
had not been met.189 Justice Corn, though, admitted to receiving 
$4,000 as a bribe to vote for the defendants and the case was vacated 
in 1968.190 The Oklahoma Supreme Court issued a decision 
affirming the trial court on rehearing in 1970.191  
For both of these cases, in the decade or more between the initial 
decision and the court’s subsequent reversal on rehearing, these 
decisions were viewed as binding192 and litigants lost in part because 
of the cases’ precedential effect. For instance, in Perdue v. 
Hartman193 the Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that Marshall, 
among other cases, established a high standard for the creation of a 
constructive trust that was not met.194 Along the same lines, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Albert & Harlow, Inc. v. Fitzgerald195 
concluded that O’Neil barred the introduction of parol evidence in 
connection with a written contract and reversed the trial court’s 
finding in favor of the defendant.196 To the extent that the corrupt 
decisions precluded litigants by precedent, they were as entitled to 
rehearing as the parties directly involved in Marshall and O’Neil. 
 
 186. Oklahoma Co. v. O’Neil, 440 P.2d. 978 (Okla. 1968). 
 187. Marshall v. Amos, 300 P.2d 990 (Okla. 1955). 
 188. Id. at 994. 
 189. Id. at 990. 
 190. 442 P.2d 500 (Okla. 1968). 
 191. 471 P.2d 896 (Okla. 1970). 
 192. See, e.g., Hill v. Field, 384 F.2d 829, 833 n.5 (10th Cir. 1967) (relying on O’Neil as 
establishing Oklahoma law); Peter Fox Brewing v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 189 F. Supp. 743 
(C.D. Ill. 1961) (relying on O’Neil as establishing Oklahoma law); Barry v. Frizzell, 371 P.2d 
460, 463 (Okla. 1962) (quoting Marshall, 300 P.2d at 994).  
 193. 408 P.2d 293 (Okla. 1965). 
 194. Id. at 297. 
 195. 389 P.2d 994, 996 (Okla. 1964).  
 196. Id. at 997. 
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Such a result would not dramatically undermine the rule of law. 
As was true in the Manton cases, rehearing likely would not have 
changed the result. The central holding of Marshall relied on in 
Perdue was that a constructive trust could not be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence, but instead required a higher level of 
proof.197 This is an accurate statement of trust law as a general matter 
and contemporaneous cases in Oklahoma reached the same result.198 
Albert & Harlow, Inc. saw O’Neil as holding that absent fraud or 
mistake, written contracts supersede prior oral discussions and parol 
evidence cannot change the terms of a written agreement,199 a 
version of the parol evidence rule that is uncontroversial.200  
Moreover, the fact that some litigants are entitled to rehearing 
does not reopen decisions broadly to collateral attack. In the 
Oklahoma cases, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between 
those cases where bribes had been known to take place and those 
where the corrupt judges were the deciding vote but no bribery was 
known. Litigants were not able to disqualify the judges in 5 to 4 
decisions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court merely because there 
were bribes in unrelated cases.201 In the cases where no known bribes 
took place, the judgments retain their preclusive value and as a 
result, they should retain their stare decisis effect as well. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The core claim of this Article is that from the standpoint of due 
process, preclusion and precedent operate identically on nonparties. 
Stare decisis survives while preclusion fails precisely because it has a 
broad impact and allows nonparties to shape their conduct with the 
expectation that precedent will bind them and others. Since 
preclusion does not generally apply to those not before the courts, it 
fails to provide the reliance benefits that allow precedent to survive. 
This approach shifts the analysis from a formalist view on 
preclusion and stare decisis to a functional one. Ronald J. Allen and 
 
 197. 408 P.2d at 297. 
 198. See G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 472 (2d 
ed. 1978); Starnes v. Barker, 340 P.2d 463, 465 (Okla. 1959) (“It is also well settled in this 
jurisdiction that a constructive trust cannot arise from presumption but must be established by 
clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence.”).  
 199. Albert & Harlow, Inc., 389 P.2d at 996.  
 200. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 214–15 (1981).  
 201. See Johnson v. Johnson, 424 P.2d 414, 418 (Okla. 1967).  
DO NOT DELETE 4/12/2010 3:19 PM 
597 Saving Stare Decisis 
 633 
Michael S. Pardo have taken a similar approach in drawing the 
distinction between law and fact.202 They argue that functional 
considerations, e.g., the relationship between the judge and the jury, 
determine whether an issue is labeled as legal or factual.203 The same 
analysis applies here. Stare decisis is allowed to bind nonparties 
because that is exactly the function of a doctrine of precedent. 
 
 
 202. Allen & Pardo, supra note 106. 
 203. Id. at 1770 (“[T]he quest to find ‘the’ essential difference between the two that can 
control subsequent classifications of questions as legal or factual is doomed from the start, as 
there is no essential difference. . . . [F]unctional considerations underlie the decision to label 
any given issue ‘legal’ or ‘factual.’”). 
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